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Libertarianism and Judicial Deference  
Ilya Somin* 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the last thirty years, libertarian constitutional theory has risen 
from near-total obscurity to a significant role in debates over constitutional 
interpretation and judicial review. Libertarian scholars such as Randy 
Barnett, Richard Epstein, and the late Bernard Siegan have had a major 
influence on scholarship over a wide range of constitutional issues.1 Ideas 
developed by libertarians have also had a substantial impact on court 
decisions in the fields of federalism, property rights, and gun rights, among 
others.  
Georgetown University law professor Randy Barnett and other 
libertarian scholars played an important role in developing the arguments 
behind the recent challenge to the constitutionality of the Obama health 
care plan individual mandate.2 The recent revival of “public use” 
jurisprudence on property rights was in large part stimulated by cases 
brought by the libertarian Institute for Justice.3 Libertarians also brought 
the lawsuit that led to the Supreme Court’s recognition of an individual 
right to bear arms under the Second Amendment, in District of Columbia v. 
Heller,4 and its application against the states two years later.5 More 
generally, libertarian ideas have had a major influence in both the academy 
and in developing a number of successful public interest law firms that 
have won notable victories in both courtrooms and the court of public 
opinion.6 
 
 * Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law. I would like to thank David 
Bernstein and Josh Blackman for helpful comments and suggestions, and Greg Mottla for valuable 
research assistance. 
 1 See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF 
LIBERTY (2004) [hereinafter BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION]; RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, 
TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985); BERNARD H. SIEGAN, 
ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION (1980). 
 2 See Josh Blackman, Back to the Future of Originalism, 16 CHAP. L. REV. 325 (2013). 
 3 See especially Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 500 (2005) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting), where four Justices embraced a restrictive interpretation of “public use” long advocated by 
libertarians. 
 4 554 U.S. 570 (2008). For an account of the key role of libertarians in bringing this case and 
developing the arguments behind it, see BRIAN DOHERTY, GUN CONTROL ON TRIAL: INSIDE THE 
SUPREME COURT BATTLE OVER THE SECOND AMENDMENT (2008). 
 5 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). Prominent libertarian lawyer Alan Gura 
litigated the McDonald case and relied on considerable libertarian scholarship on gun rights. 
 6 See generally STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT (2008). 
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These are impressive achievements for a relatively small group of 
scholars and activists that remains heavily outnumbered by left-liberals in 
both the academy and the legal profession more generally.7 But it is still 
not entirely clear whether libertarianism as such can make a distinctive 
contribution to constitutional theory. Individual libertarian scholars and 
activists have developed important and influential ideas about 
constitutional interpretation. But many of those ideas are not distinctively 
libertarian. There is no doubt that libertarians can make a distinctive 
contribution to constitutional theory. But whether libertarianism can do so 
is a different question. 
In this article, I suggest that libertarian thought can make at least one 
distinctive contribution to constitutional theory: greater skepticism about 
doctrines of judicial deference to the supposedly superior expertise of the 
political branches of government. I do not here seek to prove that 
libertarian ideas definitively refute the case for such deference. But they are 
an important contribution to the debate over the subject. 
In Part I, I briefly describe the kind of deference my analysis focuses 
on: cases where judges allow the legislature or the executive to determine 
the scope of its own authority under some part of the Constitution because 
of the political branches’ superior knowledge of the relevant issues. 
Although the judges in question recognize that the Constitution limits 
government power over the issue in question, they defer to legislative or 
executive interpretations of the scope of those limits. A major rationale for 
such deference is the superior judgment or expertise of the political 
branches of government. This argument for deference is seen in many 
areas, including federalism, property rights, and criminal defendants’ 
rights, among others. 
Part II explains why libertarian thought casts doubt on the expertise 
rationale for judicial deference. That rationale implicitly assumes that the 
legislature and executive have benevolent motives and superior expertise to 
which judges should defer. Libertarian thought poses a strong challenge to 
both assumptions, even if it does not definitively refute them in all possible 
cases. 
Finally, in Part III, I explain why skepticism about judicial deference 
is a distinctively libertarian contribution to constitutional theory. It is a 
logical extension of libertarian skepticism about government power and the 
political process. Much more than originalism—the idea with which 
libertarian constitutional theory is principally associated—it is a natural 
extension of libertarian political thought. 
 
Despite the title, this book focuses mostly on libertarians rather than social conservatives. Cf. Ilya 
Somin, Lessons From the Rise of Legal Conservatism, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 415 (2009) 
(reviewing Teles’ book). 
 7 In the legal profession overall, libertarians are probably outnumbered by conservatives as well 
as liberals. 
Do Not Delete 4/9/2013 10:05 PM 
2013] Libertarianism and Judicial Deference 295 
I.  JUDICIAL DEFERENCE AND THE CONSTITUTION 
There are many situations where courts defer to the legislature or the 
executive and refuse to strike down their actions as unconstitutional. Here, 
I focus on one major form of deference: cases where courts recognize that 
the Constitution limits government power in some way, but largely defer to 
the legislature or the executive in determining the scope of those limits.  
One noteworthy example is the Supreme Court’s treatment of the 
Public Use Clause of the Fifth Amendment, where the Court recognizes 
that private property may not be condemned for a purely private purpose 
but also adheres to a “policy of deference to legislative judgments in this 
field,”8 thereby essentially allowing the legislature to determine for itself 
which kinds of condemnations genuinely advance “public purposes,” as the 
Court held is required by the Fifth Amendment.9 
Similar deference is common in Supreme Court decisions determining 
the scope of congressional power under the Commerce Clause and 
Necessary and Proper Clause.10 The Commerce Clause gives Congress the 
authority to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, and commerce with 
the Indian tribes.11 Modern jurisprudence interprets the Clause as giving 
Congress the authority to regulate any economic activities that, in the 
aggregate, “substantially affect” interstate commerce.12 Even in Gonzales v. 
Raich,13 the Supreme Court’s most expansive interpretation of commerce 
power, the Court recognizes that there are some limits to congressional 
authority.14 But it also allows Congress to determine whether the 
“economic” activity it seeks to regulate really does substantially affect 
interstate commerce, so long as Congress has a minimal “rational basis” for 
its conclusion.15 Even in the case of noneconomic activity, Congress is 
allowed to regulate, so long as it has a rational basis for concluding that 
doing so is necessary to implement a broader “regulatory scheme” aimed at 
controlling interstate commerce.16 In analyzing assertions of congressional 
authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause, the Supreme Court also 
 
 8 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 480. 
 9 See also Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (holding that “[t]he role of the judiciary in 
determining whether [eminent domain] is being exercised for a public purpose is an extremely narrow 
one,” and if the “legislature has spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh 
conclusive”); Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240–41 (1984) (holding that a taking is 
constitutional under the Public Use Clause if “the exercise of the eminent domain power is rationally 
related to a conceivable public purpose”). 
 10 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 11 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 12 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995). 
 13 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
 14 Id. at 9–10 (seeking to distinguish Raich from previous cases striking down laws as beyond 
Congress’ Commerce Clause authority). 
 15 Id. at 22. 
 16 Id. at 19. For a more detailed discussion of these two aspects of Raich, see Ilya Somin, 
Gonzales v. Raich: Federalism as a Casualty of the War on Drugs, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 507 
(2006). 
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defers to Congress’ judgment on whether legislation is “necessary” for 
“carry[ing] into execution” one of Congress’ other powers.17  
Such deference occurs in many other areas of constitutional law and is 
used as a justification for many judicial decisions.18 Other notable 
examples include deference to legislative judgment on the Eighth 
Amendment and criminal procedure,19 judicial deference to Congress’ 
decisions on what legislation is needed to implement the Fourteenth 
Amendment under its Section 5 authority to enact “appropriate” legislation 
for that purpose,20 judicial deference on constitutional issues involving 
foreign affairs,21 and others.22 Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule have 
argued for broad judicial deference to the executive on issues relating to 
terrorism and war.23 
The standard rationale for this kind of judicial deference is the need to 
give scope for the political branch’s superior expertise. As Justice John 
Paul Stevens’ majority opinion in Kelo puts it, “the needs of society have 
varied between different parts of the Nation,” thereby justifying “a strong 
theme of federalism [in the Court’s property rights jurisprudence], 
emphasizing the ‘great respect’ that we owe to state legislatures and state 
courts in discerning local public needs.”24 That superior expertise may 
involve both technical knowledge of policy issues and superior 
understanding of public values and public opinion.25 In the former 
category, superior expertise might involve both Congress’ understanding of 
policy in general, and state or local governments’ superior knowledge of 
local conditions.26 
 
 17 See United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1956, 1970 (2010) (holding that necessity is 
satisfied if Congress adopts “a means that is rationally related to the implementation of a 
constitutionally enumerated power”). 
 18 See generally KERMIT ROOSEVELT III, THE MYTH OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM (2006) (arguing that 
the issue of expertise-based deference justifies a wide range of Supreme Court decisions). 
 19 Dru Stevenson, Judicial Deference to Legislatures in Constitutional Analysis, 90 N.C. L. REV. 
2083 (2012); Eric Berger, In Search of a Theory of Deference: The Eighth Amendment, Democratic 
Pedigree, and Constitutional Decision Making, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1 (2010). 
 20 See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 652–56 (1966) (concluding that Congress need 
only have a rational basis for believing that a given law is appropriate under Section 5). 
 21 See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320–21 (1936) (noting 
that the president’s superior information and expertise on foreign policy justifies judicial deference to 
congressional delegations of power to him on foreign affairs issues). 
 22 See ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF 
LEGAL INTERPRETATION 230–31 (2006) (claiming that “[j]udges should thus defer to legislatures on the 
interpretation of constitutional texts that are ambiguous, can be read at multiple levels of generality, or 
embody aspirational norms whose content changes over time with shifting public values”). 
 23 See ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY, 
AND THE COURTS (2007). 
 24 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 482 (1908) (quoting Hairston v. Danville & 
Western R. Co., 208 U.S. 598, 606–07).  
 25 For the latter argument, see, e.g., VERMEULE, supra note 22, at 225 (arguing that the legislature 
and the executive are better at discerning societal values than courts); Richard C. Worf, The Case for 
Rational Basis Review of General Suspicionless Searches and Seizures, 23 TOURO L. REV. 93, 110–30 
(2007). 
 26 See Ilya Somin, Federalism and Property Rights, 2011 U. CHI. LEG. F. 53, 53–54, 66–67 
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It is important to distinguish deference to superior legislative or 
executive expertise from cases where the courts do not defer, but make 
their own independent judgment that the Constitution allows another 
branch of government to make a particular decision. For example, the 
Court has ruled that the Senate has the sole power to determine the 
procedures to be used in impeachment trials, even though there is no reason 
to believe that that institution has greater expertise than the courts on issues 
of judicial procedure.27 Even if the courts never defer to legislative or 
executive expertise at all, they could still uphold many assertions of 
government power on other grounds, including the text of the Constitution, 
the original meaning, or a variety of “living Constitution” theories.28 
Nonetheless, the alleged need to defer to legislative or executive 
expertise is an important argument that recurs in many contexts. It is one of 
the major reasons cited to justify judicial deference to the legislature on 
property rights and federalism issues, among others.29 For these reasons, it 
is central to debates over many disputed constitutional questions. 
II.  THE LIBERTARIAN CRITIQUE OF JUDICIAL DEFERENCE 
Libertarian thought creates a basis for a wide-ranging critique of 
judicial deference to the supposedly superior expertise of the legislature 
and the executive. The case for judicial deference to legislative and 
executive expertise rests on two implicit assumptions that are vulnerable to 
criticism: that the political branches of government are applying their 
expertise for the purpose of promoting the public interest, and that they 
really do have greater expertise than the private sector or lower level 
governments. Libertarian political and economic thought casts serious 
doubt on both. 
These two assumptions may not be relevant to non-expertise based 
rationales for judicial passivity. For example, one can argue that judges 
should generally let legislatures do as they wish because the legislature 
represents the will of political majorities, and majorities have an inherent 
right to rule, regardless of whether their decisions are informed by superior 
knowledge. As Robert Bork puts it, “in wide areas of life majorities are 
entitled to rule, if they wish, simply because they are majorities.”30 This 
and some other justifications for judicial nonintervention do not depend on 
superior knowledge and expertise on the part of the political branches of 
government. But the expertise justification for deference is often advanced 
 
[hereinafter Somin, Federalism and Property Rights] (describing widespread deployment of the latter 
argument to justify judicial deference to state legislatures on property rights issues). 
 27 See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 229–41 (1993). 
 28 For a recent defense of the latter, see DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010). 
 29 See Somin, Federalism and Property Rights, supra note 26, at 53–54, 66–67 (describing use of 
deference arguments to justify judicial deference to state legislatures on property rights issues). 
 30 ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 139 (1990). For my critique of this argument, 
see ILYA SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE (Stanford University Press, forthcoming 
2013) [hereinafter SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE] (on file with author). 
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and plays a major role in a number of important constitutional doctrines. 
The libertarian critique of its assumptions therefore has significant 
implications for constitutional theory. 
A. The Assumption of Benevolence 
There is little point in deferring to expertise if that expertise is not 
being applied in an objective manner intended to promote the public 
interest. If, for example, government officials are using their superior 
expertise to expand their own power or to benefit some narrow interest 
group, there is little justification for judicial deference to their expertise. 
Indeed, superior expertise in the service of evil ends may be even worse 
than a government pursuing the same malign purposes with lesser 
competence. Other things equal, a competent and knowledgeable evildoer 
is likely to cause more harm than one who is ignorant and ineffective.31 
When such is the case, judges may actually need to be less deferential in 
cases where the government’s expertise is unusually great because giving 
the government free rein is likely to cause unusually great harm. 
Even if the government is simply morally neutral, as opposed to 
actively malevolent, the case for judicial deference is relatively weakened. 
If the government is morally neutral, then whether its constitutionally 
suspect actions serve good purposes or not is essentially random. Cases 
where judicial review ends up curbing beneficial government actions are 
likely to be offset by those where it prevents harmful ones, and vice versa. 
In that situation, there is no reason to prefer deference to nondeferential 
judicial review. 
The calculus does not change if we define the relevant moral 
considerations not in terms of harm and benefit to the public, but in terms 
of adherence to the Constitution. A government with evil purposes is 
unlikely to give unbiased consideration to the constitutional issue on which 
the courts have deferred to it. For example, it is unlikely to use its expertise 
to objectively consider whether a challenged condemnation really does 
promote a “public purpose.”32 It will instead pursue its real objective while 
paying no more than lip service to constitutional issues. 
The morally neutral government will be little better on this score. It 
may not be actively hostile to constitutional constraints on its power. But it 
is likely to be indifferent to them. Since serious expert consideration of 
constitutional issues requires affirmative effort, the morally neutral 
government might simply not bother with it. 
The case for judicial deference to legislative expertise is therefore 
implicitly based on what libertarian public choice scholars call “the 
 
 31 Cf. SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE, supra note 30 (manuscript at ch. 2) 
(explaining how a knowledgeable electorate with evil values might be even worse than an ignorant 
electorate with the same deplorable goals). 
 32 For a discussion of this issue see supra Part I. 
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benevolent despot model of politics and government,”33 which assumes that 
government is a unitary entity pursuing benevolent objectives. If the 
government is pursuing evil purposes or is morally neutral, the case for 
judicial deference to its superior expertise is greatly weakened.  
In this, as in other areas of political economy,34 libertarian scholars 
can perform a useful service simply by pointing out that a key argument 
implicitly relies on the benevolent despot assumption. Once the crucial role 
of the assumption is exposed, we can begin to consider the extent to which 
it is valid. 
Some will likely resist this conclusion on the ground that there is no 
objective morality on the basis of which we can assess the government’s 
actions. If we embrace moral relativism or believe that judges should do 
so,35 perhaps there is no basis for ignoring the government’s expertise on 
the grounds that it might be in the service of evil ends.  
Unfortunately, the moral relativist case for judicial deference collapses 
into contradiction. If there is no objective standard for judging the morality 
of our actions, then there is no case for deferring to legislative or judicial 
expertise. After all, there is no way of knowing whether such deference is 
good, bad, or morally indifferent. Indeed, for moral relativists, there is no 
case for adherence to any notion of judicial duty. A consistent moral 
relativist has no basis for censuring a judge who makes decisions based on 
his own political preferences or even simply flipping a coin. 
Libertarian political theory offers several reasons to doubt the validity 
of the benevolent despot assumption underlying judicial deference to 
legislative expertise. First and most obviously, government often acts to 
benefit narrow interest groups at the expense of the general public. 
Libertarian public choice scholars have been at the forefront of those 
studying interest group “rent-seeking” and its influence over public 
policy.36 Small interest groups can often outmaneuver the general public 
because a smaller group is easier to organize for political action than a 
larger one, facing fewer collective action problems.37  
In addition to lobbying by private sector interest groups, government 
is also heavily influenced by the self-interest of government bureaucrats 
 
 33 See, e.g., GEOFFREY BRENNAN & JAMES BUCHANAN, THE REASON OF RULES: 
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 55 (1985) [hereinafter BRENNAN & BUCHANAN, THE REASON 
OF RULES] (“[T]he benevolent despot model of politics and government has promoted and sustained 
monumental confusion in social science, and social philosophy more generally.”). 
 34 See, e.g., GEOFFREY BRENNAN & JAMES BUCHANAN, THE POWER TO TAX: ANALYTICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF A FISCAL CONSTITUTION 7, 14 (1980) (exposing the implications of dropping that 
assumption in discussions of federalism and tax policy). 
 35 For defenses of moral relativisms, see generally DAVID B. WONG, MORAL RELATIVITY (1984); 
DAVID B. WONG, NATURAL MORALITIES: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISTIC RELATIVISM (2006). 
 36 For a survey of the relevant public choice literature on interest group influence, see DENNIS C. 
MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III 333–59 (2003). 
 37 For the classic statement of this problem, see MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE 
ACTION (rev. ed. 1971). 
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and other officials, who form powerful lobbies of their own.38 The role of 
teachers’ unions in inhibiting education reform is a notable and remarkably 
persistent example.39 Government officials even often pressure private 
interests to contribute money to their campaigns and programs, threatening 
them with hostile legislation if they refuse.40 
Obviously, outside interest group pressure and self-dealing by 
government officials themselves is to some degree constrained by public 
opinion. If elected officials cave in to interest groups too much—especially 
in ways that are visible to the voters—there may be retribution at the ballot 
box.41 But that kind of democratic accountability is often undermined by 
the reality of widespread political ignorance among voters. Often, the 
public is unaware of interest group activities, or even misperceives them as 
beneficial.42 Moreover, to the extent that relatively ignorant public opinion 
has a major influence on public policy, it diminishes the extent to which 
that policy is controlled by knowledgeable officials and experts. That, in 
turn, undermines the assumption of superior knowledge, the second key 
pillar of judicial deference to expertise. 
Few libertarians would argue that government never acts out of 
benevolent motives. But the prevalence of nonbenevolent ones in many 
situations undercuts the expertise rationale for deference, which assumes 
that benevolence is present as a general rule, and not just in some particular 
cases. 
B. The Assumption of Superior Knowledge 
There can be no expertise justification for judicial deference if the 
challenged government policies are not in fact based on superior 
knowledge. There is little doubt that legislatures and executive branch 
officials often have superior knowledge relative to federal judges. If that 
were the only relevant comparison, it could justify judicial deference on a 
wide range of issues.43 In many cases, however, judicial deference ends up 
transferring decision-making authority to actors who are less 
 
 38 See MUELLER, supra note 36, at 359–85; WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND 
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 38–39 (1971); WILLIAM C. MITCHELL & RANDY T. SIMMONS, 
BEYOND POLITICS: MARKETS, WELFARE, AND THE FAILURE OF BUREAUCRACY 58–62, 114–16 (1994). 
 39 See TERRY M. MOE, SPECIAL INTEREST: TEACHERS UNIONS AND AMERICA’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
7–10 (2011) (explaining why union lobbying is possibly the single biggest obstacle to improving 
education quality). 
 40 See generally FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT EXTRACTION, 
AND POLITICAL EXTORTION (1997). 
 41 Such “retrospective voting” is often emphasized by scholars who are relatively optimistic 
about voter competence. See, e.g., MORRIS P. FIORINA, RETROSPECTIVE VOTING IN AMERICAN 
NATIONAL ELECTIONS (1981). For my critique, see SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE, 
supra note 30 (manuscript at ch. 4). 
 42 See the discussion of political ignorance in Part II.B. 
 43 See, e.g., Somin, Federalism and Property Rights, supra note 26, at 80–86 (explaining why the 
expertise rationale for judicial deference on property rights issues can also apply to a wide range of 
other issues). 
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knowledgeable than those who would decide the issue if the judiciary were 
to strike down the law in question. 
When the judiciary strikes down a law because it violates some 
constitutionally protected individual right, it allows private individuals to 
decide for themselves what they wish to do. A decision protecting property 
rights, for example, enables property owners to decide for themselves what 
they are going to do with their possessions. A decision protecting freedom 
of speech allows people to decide for themselves what speech they will 
engage in.  
Often, private sector actors have better knowledge than the 
government about decisions of theirs that the government seeks to restrict. 
As Nobel Prize-winning libertarian economist F.A. Hayek famously 
emphasized, participants in markets and civil society have “local 
knowledge” that is unavailable to government officials and planners.44 
Such local knowledge includes “knowledge of the particular circumstances 
of time and place” with respect to which “practically every individual has 
some advantage over all others” because “he possesses unique information 
of which beneficial use might be made, but of which use can be made only 
if the decisions depending on it are left to him or are made with his active 
cooperation.”45 As a general rule, government regulators are less likely to 
have such detailed local knowledge, especially when establishing a 
regulatory rule that will apply to the entire nation or a large state.46 
Moreover, a great deal of valuable information about potential 
opportunities and opportunity costs is contained in a market price system.47 
Prices convey information about the relative value of a wide range of goods 
and services, and their inputs. When government regulation restricts market 
transactions, it disrupts the price system and often prevents it from 
transmitting that information to private sector actors.48 
If judicial protection of individual rights constrains government action 
and lets private sector actors make decisions for themselves, it can help 
ensure that those decisions are made by parties who have greater 
knowledge rather than lesser. Far from undermining well-informed 
decision-making, such judicial review might actually facilitate it. 
This conclusion is reinforced by the reality of widespread voter 
ignorance.49 Many studies show that public opinion has a significant 
 
 44 F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945). 
 45 Id. at 521–22. 
 46 For a discussion of why this is likely to be true in the case of regulation of property rights, see 
Somin, Federalism and Property Rights, supra note 26, at 66–71. 
 47 Hayek, supra note 44, at 521–29 (arguing that too much government restriction can prevent the 
use of valuable information, as those who control only know a small percentage of the potential 
opportunities). 
 48 See id. For a more detailed exposition, see THOMAS SOWELL, KNOWLEDGE AND DECISIONS 
(1980). 
 49 For a detailed discussion of the relevance of political ignorance to issues of judicial deference 
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influence on policy.50 Unfortunately, a great deal of data also shows that 
the public tends to be highly ignorant about a wide range of policy issues.51 
For example, most Americans have little idea that entitlements such as 
Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security are by far the biggest items of 
domestic spending in the federal budget, despite the ongoing debate over 
budgetary issues over the last few years.52  
Such ignorance is actually rational behavior for most voters. If one’s 
only reason to become informed about politics is to influence the outcome 
of an election, that turns out to be not much reason at all, given the low 
probability of a vote being decisive.53 In a presidential election, for 
example, the odds vary from state to state, averaging out to about 1 in 60 
million.54  
In addition, voters who do acquire some political knowledge—often 
for reasons unrelated to becoming a “better” voter—have little incentive to 
rationally evaluate whatever information they learn. Like acquiring 
information in the first place, evaluating it in a logical and unbiased way 
requires time and effort. It can also be psychologically painful if the new 
information ends up undermining cherished partisan or ideological 
commitments. Given the low probability that their vote will be decisive, 
voters have little incentive to sacrifice time, effort, and psychological 
comfort for the sake of evaluating political information more logically. 
Instead, they tend to evaluate political information in a highly biased way 
that overvalues anything that reinforces their preexisting views, while 
ignoring or undervaluing evidence that cuts the other way.55 Libertarian 
economist Bryan Caplan calls this pattern “rational irrationality.”56 Because 
the incentive for rational evaluation of political information is so low, it is 
 
to expertise in the context of property rights cases, see Somin, Federalism and Property Rights, supra 
note 26, at 71–77. 
 50 For citations to the relevant literature, see SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE, 
supra note 30 (manuscript at chs. 1–4). 
 51 See id. (manuscript at ch. 1) (presenting extensive evidence). For further discussion and 
evidence regarding extensive voter ignorance, see also SCOTT L. ALTHAUS, COLLECTIVE PREFERENCES 
IN DEMOCRATIC POLITICS (2003); MICHAEL X. DELLI CARPINI & SCOTT KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS 
KNOW ABOUT POLITICS AND WHY IT MATTERS (1996); RICK SHENKMAN, JUST HOW STUPID ARE WE?: 
FACING THE TRUTH ABOUT THE AMERICAN VOTER (2008); Ilya Somin, Political Ignorance and the 
Countermajoritarian Difficulty: A New Perspective on the Central Obsession of Constitutional Theory, 
89 IOWA L. REV. 1287, 1290–1304 (2004); Ilya Somin, Voter Ignorance and the Democratic Ideal, 12 
CRITICAL REV. 413, 413–19 (1998). 
 52 SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE, supra note 30 (manuscript at ch. 1). 
 53 The idea of rational political ignorance was first introduced by Anthony Downs. See ANTHONY 
DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 238–59 (1957); see also SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND 
POLITICAL IGNORANCE, supra note 30 (manuscript at ch. 4) (providing a detailed recent discussion). 
 54 SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE, supra note 30 (manuscript at ch. 4). 
 55 See generally BRYAN CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER: WHY DEMOCRACIES 
CHOOSE BAD POLICIES (2007) [hereinafter CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER]; see also 
SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE, supra note 30 (manuscript at ch. 4) (citing relevant 
studies). 
 56 See CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER, supra note 55, at 122–23; Bryan Caplan, 
Rational Ignorance versus Rational Irrationality, 54 KYKLOS 3, 4 (2001). 
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actually rational behavior for voters to make little or no effort to be logical 
and unbiased in making political judgments. 
The implication for judicial deference to expertise is significant. In 
cases where legislation is influenced by public opinion, it is also likely to 
be influenced by political ignorance and irrationality. That does not 
necessarily mean that the legislation in question is harmful. But it does 
mean that judges and others should not assume that it is the result of 
unbiased expert judgment, or even judgment that reflects greater expertise 
than that possessed by the average judge. After all, most judges are 
probably far more educated and politically informed than the median 
voter.57 
The above critique of the superior knowledge assumption should not 
be overstated. It does not apply nearly as strongly in cases where judicial 
invalidation of legislative or executive action protects not individual 
decision-making, but decisions by other branches or levels of government. 
Such cases include judicial decisions on issues involving federalism and 
separation of powers, among others. For example, when the Supreme Court 
invalidated a congressional statute allowing a single-house “veto” of 
executive action,58 the net effect was to give more power to the executive, 
not to empower private choice. Similarly, if a federal law preempting state 
or local law is invalidated, then state and local governments will control the 
ultimate resolution of the issue at hand. 
But it is worth noting that some invalidations of federal law indirectly 
empower private actors if the activity in question is not regulated by state 
governments, or state regulations are less sweeping than the federal ones. 
Had the Supreme Court invalidated the federal ban on possession of 
medical marijuana in Gonzales v. Raich,59 it would have empowered 
private decision-makers in the many states where medical marijuana is 
legal.60 
The knowledge point developed here also does not apply to cases 
where judicial invalidation of legislative or executive action leads to 
judicial management of government institutions such as prisons and public 
schools, rather than empowerment of private decision-makers.61 Such 
 
 57 I am not aware of any studies that compare judges’ political knowledge to that of the general 
public. However, knowledge is highly correlated with both education and interest in politics. See 
SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE, supra note 30 (manuscript at Appendix); DELLI 
CARPINI & KEETER, supra note 51. And it is probably a safe assumption that the average federal judge 
has a high level of education and much greater interest in politics than the average voter. 
 58 Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983). 
 59 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
 60 According to a survey conducted by a pro-medical marijuana group, medical marijuana use is 
legal in 18 states and the District of Columbia. See 18 Legal Medical Marijuana States and DC: Laws, 
Fees, and Possession Limits, PROCON.ORG (Jan. 7, 2013, 1:42 PM), 
http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000881. 
 61 See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990) (partially upholding district court decision 
that took control of Kansas City school district away from local government and ordered tax increases 
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judicial intervention may be justified on various grounds, including the 
need to combat longstanding violations of constitutional principles. But 
taking advantage of the superior knowledge of private actors is not likely to 
be one of them.  
Similar issues may arise in cases where judicial review forces other 
government actors to expand their interventions in the economy or civil 
society. In these situations, judicial intervention might actually exacerbate 
knowledge problems associated with government decision-making. While 
such cases are more common in constitutional systems with judicially 
enforceable “positive” socioeconomic rights,62 they are quite rare in the 
U.S. constitutional system, where the national Constitution contains few, if 
any, such rights.63 Such issues do arise more often at the state level, where 
many state constitutions contain positive rights, such as the right to 
education, which has led some state courts to force the government to 
increase education spending, often with little or no improvement in student 
performance.64 
C. Implications 
The libertarian critique of the implicit “benevolent despot” assumption 
underlying judicial deference is an important contribution to the debate 
over the subject. Obviously, my summary of that critique in this article is 
not enough to prove that judicial deference to expertise is always 
unwarranted. The extent to which actual government decision-making 
departs from the assumptions of benevolent purpose and superior 
knowledge may well vary among issue areas. Also, as noted above, the 
critique of the superior knowledge assumption is much weaker in cases that 
do not involve judicial protection of individual rights.  
Nonetheless, the libertarian critique does raise issues that jurists and 
legal scholars must carefully consider. Both critics and defenders of 
judicial deference would do well to take account of them. 
 
for purposes of alleviating school segregation); MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL 
POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA’S PRISONS (1999) 
(describing judicial management of prison systems found to be in violation of the Eighth Amendment). 
The Supreme Court limited judicial control of Kansas City schools in a follow-up case, Missouri v. 
Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 100–01 (1995). 
 62 See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS DO 221–38 
(2001) (discussing judicial enforcement of positive socioeconomic rights in the case of South Africa). 
 63 Efforts to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment as mandating positive rights have met with little 
success in the courts. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 54–55 (1973) 
(rejecting claims that it establishes a positive right to equal education funding). 
 64 See ERIC A. HANUSHEK & ALFRED A. LINDSETH, SCHOOLHOUSES, COURTHOUSES, AND 
STATEHOUSES: SOLVING THE FUNDING-ACHIEVEMENT PUZZLE IN AMERICA’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS 145–70 
(2009) (surveying the results of judicial intervention in this field, and concluding that it has been largely 
ineffective). 
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III.  A DISTINCTIVELY LIBERTARIAN CONTRIBUTION TO CONSTITUTIONAL 
THEORY 
In addition to its substantive significance, the libertarian critique of 
judicial deference is notable as a distinctively libertarian contribution to 
constitutional theory. While non-libertarians certainly can, and sometimes 
do, endorse many parts of it, the critique is closely tied to libertarian 
suspicion of government and the political process. It is no accident that 
libertarian scholars have taken a leading role in developing public choice 
theory, the branch of economics devoted to analyzing interest group 
influence over public policy in a way that does not assume that government 
actors have benevolent motivations.65 They have also emphasized the 
deleterious consequences of rational political ignorance and irrationality.66 
In recent debates over constitutional theory, libertarian scholars are 
probably best known for their advocacy of originalism. Libertarians such as 
Randy Barnett, Gary Lawson, and Michael Rappaport have made major 
contributions to the literature explicating and defending originalism as a 
tool of constitutional interpretation.67  
But there is no necessary inherent connection between libertarianism 
and originalism. Certainly, the original meaning of the Constitution could 
mandate extremely non-libertarian results. A socialist state, for example, 
could have a constitution whose original meaning is completely antithetical 
to libertarianism.68 The same goes for a constitution that reflects extreme 
social conservative or nationalist values. It is not surprising, therefore, that 
originalism has been advocated by leading conservative and liberal 
scholars, as well as libertarian ones.69 Moreover, the idea of a consistent 
 
 65 See BRENNAN & BUCHANAN, THE REASON OF RULES, supra note 33, at 55; MUELLER, supra 
note 36, at 333–35; OLSON, supra note 37, at 2; MCCHESNEY, supra note 40, at 61–62. 
 66 See especially CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER, supra note 57. 
 67 See BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, 89–117; Randy E. Barnett, 
An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOYOLA L. REV. 611 (1999); Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, 
Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 47, 48 (2006) (arguing that the Constitution 
should be interpreted as understood by the “reasonable American” of 1788, at the time of ratification); 
John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of 
Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751 (2009); John O. McGinnis 
& Michael B. Rappaport, A Pragmatic Defense of Originalism, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 383 (2007). 
 68 The Soviet Constitution is a good real-world example. See Ilya Somin, Ginsburg and Scalia on 
Foreign Constitutions, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Feb. 8, 2012, 4:56 PM), 
http://www.volokh.com/2012/02/08/ginsburg-and-scalia-on-foreign-constitutions/ (explaining why “[a] 
careful reading of the Soviet Constitution . . . leaves little doubt that it was written for a totalitarian 
communist state”). 
 69 See James E. Ryan, Laying Claim to the Constitution: The Promise of New Textualism, 97 VA. 
L. REV. 1523, 1524–26 (2011) (arguing for a liberal version of originalism and describing “original 
meaning” as the newly dominant view in constitutional theory). For other prominent liberal versions of 
originalism, see Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST. 
COMMENT. 427, 444–49 (2007); Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. 
COMMENT. 291 (2007); Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. 
REV. 26 (2000). For conservative defenses of originalism, see BORK, supra note 30, at 144; Steven G. 
Calabresi, Introduction, in ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF DEBATE 1, 12, 35 (Steven G. 
Calabresi ed., 2007) (arguing that constitutional interpretation should be based on the “the original 
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moral obligation to obey the original meaning of the Constitution is far 
from clearly consistent with libertarianism. Libertarians who believe that 
people are not morally bound to obey the dictates of government unless 
they freely consented to do so probably must reject the idea that we have 
any intrinsic duty to obey the Constitution—to which most modern 
Americans never gave any meaningful consent.70 Libertarian writer 
Lysander Spooner emphasized this point in the nineteenth century,71 and it 
remains relevant today. 
The libertarian case for originalism is necessarily contingent. It could 
turn out that some other approach will be a more effective way to promote 
a libertarian society. Obviously, a libertarian could defend originalism on 
grounds independent of the real-world libertarian effects of originalist 
decisions. For example, he or she might value adherence to the integrity of 
legal texts above promoting freedom. But such a defense of originalism, 
even if valid, would not be a specifically libertarian defense. In my view, 
libertarians may still have good reason to embrace originalism, partly 
because the available alternatives are worse, and partly because the 
supermajoritarian process by which the original meaning was created is one 
that is likely to produce good laws, on average.72 But, these are contingent 
judgments. One can easily imagine constitutions for which they would not 
hold. 
By contrast, the relationship between libertarianism and skepticism 
about judicial deference is much tighter than that between libertarianism 
and originalism. While one need not be a thoroughgoing libertarian to 
accept some or even all of the libertarian critique of deference, it does rest 
on skepticism about government that is a vital component of libertarian 
thought. It is surprising, therefore, that libertarian constitutional theorists 
have devoted relatively little systematic attention to the subject. 
CONCLUSION 
Libertarian political and economic thought provides some important 
grounds for skepticism about judicial deference to legislative and executive 
 
meaning of the constitutional text”); Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force 
of the Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1144–45 (2003); Michael Stokes 
Paulsen, A Government of Adequate Powers, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 991 (2008). 
 70 For a good discussion of libertarian consent theory, see A. John Simmons, Consent Theory for 
Libertarians, 22 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 330 (2005); see also A. JOHN SIMMONS, MORAL PRINCIPLES AND 
POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS 57–74 (1979) For explanations of why the “tacit consent” created by living in 
a territory controlled by a government is not sufficient to create an obligation to obey, see id at 75–100; 
Ilya Somin, Creation, Consent, and Government Power Over Property Rights, CATO UNBOUND (Dec. 
13, 2010, 8:56 AM), http://www.cato-unbound.org/2010/12/13/ilya-somin/creation-consent-and-
government-power-over-property-rights/. 
 71 See generally LYSANDER SPOONER, NO TREASON: THE CONSTITUTION OF NO AUTHORITY 
(1870). 
 72 See McGinnis & Rappaport, A Pragmatic Defense of Originalism, supra note 67, at 383; John 
O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and the Good Constitution, 98 GEO. L.J. 1693, 
1695 (2010). 
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expertise. These ideas represent a distinctively libertarian contribution to 
constitutional theory. 
In this article, I have not attempted to comprehensively evaluate the 
libertarian critique of deference. I merely sought to outline that criticism 
and explain its relevance to debates over deference. The ongoing debate 
over judicial deference will surely continue. As it does, both sides would 
do well to take account of relevant libertarian ideas. 
 
